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Abstract
I generalize the workhorse model of network competition (Armstrong, 1998; La¤ont, Rey
and Tirole, 1998a,b) to include income e¤ects in call demand. Income e¤ects imply that call
demand depends also on the subscription fee, not only on the call price. In the standard
case of di¤erentiated networks, weak income e¤ects are enough to deliver results in line with
stylized facts: The networks have an incentive to agree on high mobile termination rates to
soften competition. They charge a higher price for calls outside (o¤-net) than inside (on-net)
the network. This vindicates the use of (a perturbation of) the workhorse model of network
competition.
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1 Introduction
Authorities remain sceptical to network competition despite recent yearsmarket growth and the
signicant benets telecommunications have brought to consumers and producers over the course
of the years.1 A main concern are the termination rates the operators charge for connecting calls
from other networks. By agreeing on high reciprocal termination rates, the networks can jointly
commit to high call prices because of higher marginal call costs. Interconnection agreements
between networks are legally enforceable because network externalities render interconnection
desirable. For the fear of market power in the termination markets, authorities routinely cap
termination rates, even for small networks. A common requirement, at least in Europe, is that
termination rates not exceed estimated long run incremental cost.
Based upon the seminal contributions on network competition (Armstrong, 1998; La¤ont,
Rey and Tirole, 1998a,b) one would conclude that regulatory concern about excessive termina-
tion rates is exaggerated. To wit, the workhorse model shows that the existence of termination
prot creates an incentive to increase termination rates. However, with high termination rates
it is also more protable to slash the subscription fee and attract more customers: A higher
market share means that the network can save on call costs because a larger share of outgoing
calls then terminates inside the network. In the workhorse model, increased termination prot
and lower subscription fees exactly cancel out, leaving network prot independent of the termi-
nation rate (La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a). There is no incentive to collude on the termination
rate if it does not a¤ect prot. In particular, the networks should not oppose to lowering their
termination rates whenever the regulator calls for it. However, this is not how networks nor-
mally respond to tighter regulation. On the contrary, they vigorously oppose any reduction in
termination rates. The observation that networks strongly resist termination regulation while
the model predicts them to be indi¤erent, constitutes a prot neutrality puzzle.
The basic model assumes that the networks charge uniform prices for all calls. When all calls
cost the same, consumers do not care about the size of the network they belong to. Size becomes
important for the choice of network whenever networks price discriminate between calls inside
the own network (on-net) and calls to other networks (o¤-net). If on-net calls are cheaper that
o¤-net calls, as is usually the case, consumers minimize call expenditures by subscribing to the
largest network - even if both networks charge the same price for calls and subscriptions. The
larger is the network, the more advantageous it is to belong to it. Lowering the subscription
fee becomes extra protable to the individual network in this case of tari¤-mediated network
externalities (La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b) because increased network size attracts additional
customers. This network multiplier e¤ect reinforces competition for subscribers and drives down
equilibrium subscription prot. However, the network multiplier e¤ect is weaker the cheaper are
o¤-net calls in relation to on-net calls. The networks therefore soften competition by lowering
termination rates, even below marginal termination cost (Gans and King, 2001). Based on these
results, one would not expect colluding networks to oppose to cost-based price caps because the
1 In a sample of 21 OECD countries, Röller and Waverman (2001) attribute one third of economic growth over
the period 1970-90 to telecommunications infrastructure investments.
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caps would not be binding to them. Rather, the welfare problem seems to be inferior termination
rates. Collusion should also imply o¤-net prices below on-net prices, reecting comparatively
lower marginal call costs o¤-net than on-net. Yet the networks do complain about regulation,
and o¤-net prices typically are higher than on-net prices. The discrepancy between predicted
prices and observed prices under call price discrimination constitutes a o¤-net price puzzle.
I examine the robustness of the prot neutrality and o¤-net price puzzles by generalizing the
workhorse - A-LRT - model of network competition to allow for income e¤ects in call demand.
In the presence of income e¤ects, call demand depends also on the subscription fee and not
only on call prices. Income e¤ects open a channel through which high termination rates soften
competition for subscribers, namely by lowering the marginal utility of income. Subscription
demand depends on the consumer net surplus each network o¤ers its customers. Consumer net
surplus includes call utility, the cost of calls and the cost of the subscription. The lower is the
marginal utility of income, the less important is the size of the subscription fee for the choice of
network and the softer is competition for subscribers. An increase in the termination rate raises
the marginal o¤-net call cost which is passed on to consumers through the o¤-net price. The
more expensive are calls, the lower is the marginal utility of income. Thus, a higher termination
rate means a lower marginal utility of income and by implication softer competition. Prot
neutrality is a knife-edge result. Even the slightest income e¤ect tips the scales in favour of high
termination rates. Under uniform call prices, the networks generally collude by setting excessive
termination rates, except in the special case of zero income e¤ects when they are indi¤erent to
the choice of termination rate.
The network externalities that arise under call price discrimination complicate the analysis
because subscription demand is not necessarily uniquely dened anymore. Most of the papers
on network competition correct for this problem by considering di¤erentiated networks. When
networks are di¤erentiated, the price di¤erence between o¤-net and on-net calls plays little role
for the choice of network: The network multiplier e¤ect is near insignicant. Then, even weak
income e¤ects are enough to turn the standard result around. The networks now jointly prot
from setting a termination rate above the marginal cost of termination. In equilibrium, o¤-net
prices are higher than on-net prices.
To summarize: In the standard case of di¤erentiated networks, there is a model ""-income
e¤ects" away from the A-LRT model which does not lead to counter-factual predictions of the
termination rates and call prices. The puzzling prot neutrality and o¤-net price results of
the workhorse model are non-robust to the inclusion of income e¤ects in call demand. This
vindicates the use of (a perturbation of) the workhorse model of network competition.
The puzzling predictions of the basic model have stimulated extensions of the workhorse
model in many directions. Most recently, Hurkens and López (2010) analyze the importance of
consumer expectations. They show that networks jointly prot from agreeing on excessive termi-
nation rates if consumers have passive expectations. Passive expectations means that consumers
neglect the network multiplier e¤ect when they choose network, which softens competition for
consumers. All that matters for termination rates is to maximize termination prot.2 Fully re-
2Passive expectations are related to the notion of competing in utilities instead of prices. When networks
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sponsive consumers (as in A-LRT) and completely passive consumers (as in Hurkens and López,
2010) represent two extreme representations of consumer expectations. An intermediate stand
is to assume that every subscriber only takes the actions of some other customers into account
- consumers belong to so called "calling clubs". The smaller is the calling club, the weaker is
competition for subscribers and the higher is the termination rate (Hoernig et al., 2009).3
Jullien et al. (2010) assume that a proportion of subscribers are "light" users. Light users
hold subscriptions only because they value incoming calls and do not make outgoing calls.
Remember that the networks can save on call costs by cutting the subscription fee and have a
larger share of costs terminated inside the network. This incentive is weaker if a proportion of
the networks subscribers do not make any outgoing calls. Thus, termination rates are higher
when a fraction of the subscribers are light users.4
Armstrong and Wright (2009) consider network competition when there is a xed-line net-
work with locked-in subscribers in addition to mobile operators competing for mobile subscribers.
As in the workhorse model, the mobile operators would like to set low termination rates be-
tween themselves to soften competition for subscribers, but charge a high termination rate from
the xed-line operator to exercise vertical market power. Upholding higher rates for xed-line
than mobile termination is impossible if the xed-line operator can bypass termination by re-
laying calls via the competitors mobile network. If xed-line termination prot is su¢ ciently
important and arbitrage possibilities prevent price discrimination, even mobile call termination
is priced above marginal cost.5
The above papers represent substantial departures from the workhorse model by changing
the assumptions of how consumers form expectations, considering heterogenous calling patterns,
introducing xed-line networks, and so forth. The present paper complements the existing
literature by generalizing the workhorse model to include income e¤ects in call demand. A small
perturbation in this direction is all it takes to overturn the puzzling results of the workhorse
model.
compete in utilities (or consumer net surplus) they guarantee their subscribers a certain surplus independently
of the number of subscribers. Then, network size does not matter to consumers even in the case of call price
discrimination. Passive expectations and competition in utilities are not equivalent. In the latter case, the network
has to adjust the pricing plan to account for changes in market share and keep surplus constant (Calzada and
Valletti, 2008)
3This result rests on the assumption that the members of a calling club do not coordinate the choice of network.
In case of coordination, calling clubs have no e¤ect on the optimal termination rate (Calzada and Valletti, 2008;
Gabrielsen and Vagstad, 2008).
4A heterogenous calling pattern is by itself not enough to overturn prot neutrality; see Dessein (2003) and
Hahn (2004). Also, one can include call externalities and still maintain prot neutrality (Jeon et al., 2004;
Berger, 2005). When the total market size is growing, the networks generally prot from a termination rate below
termination cost (Dessein, 2003; Armstrong and Wright, 2009).
5There are a number of other circumstances under which prot neutrality fails; see Armstrong (2002) for an
elaborate discussion. The termination rate a¤ects prot if the networks are asymmetric (De Bijl and Peitz, 2002;
Carter and Wright, 2003; Armstrong and Wright, 2009). In fact, asymmetric networks may fail altogether in
reaching an agreement. Also, if networks compete in dimensions other than price, for example quality, they might
benet from a high termination rate in order to curb investments (Valletti and Cambini, 2005).
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2 Uniform Call Prices: The Prot Neutrality Puzzle
The Model I generalize the workhorse model by Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey and Ti-
role (1998a and b), henceforth A-LRT, to allow for income e¤ects in call demand. A continuum
of consumers with unit measure are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Each consumer
subscribes to one of two networks located at each end of the interval. I assume in this section
that all calls have the same price, whereas the next section allows networks to price discrim-
inate between calls inside (on-net) and outside (o¤-net) ones own network. The call pattern
is balanced: Every subscriber to network i = 1; 2 places qi calls at the price pi  0 per call
to every other subscriber to maximize utility U (qi) + Z(yi), subject to the budget constraint
piqi + yi + ti  I. Call utility features constant elasticity: U(q) = (1  1=)q1 1=, with  > 1.
Consumption y of the numeraire good renders utility Z(y) = y   "y2=2, where "  0. The
workhorse, A-LRT model, features quasi-linear utility: " = 0. Denote by ti the subscription fee,
and let I be exogenous income.
Utility maximization yields call demand Di = D(pi; ti), demand Yi = Y (pi; ti) for the nu-
meraire good and a shadow price of the budget constraint i = (pi; ti). A di¤erence between
this model and A-LRT is that call demand now decreases in the subscription fee ti and not only
in the call price pi; see the Appendix for the details. The consumer net surplus in network i is
vi = V (pi; ti) = U (D(pi; ti)) + Z(Y (pi; ti)) + (pi; ti)(I   piD(pi; ti)  Y (pi; ti)  ti). (1)
The consumer located at k 2 [0; 1] derives utility v0+ v1  k from subscribing to network 1
and utility v0+v2   j1 kj of subscribing to network 2, where v0 is the utility of holding a sub-
scription, whereas  is the virtual transportation cost and a measure of horizontal di¤erentiation.
The customer base of network i equals
Si =  (vi; vj) =
1
2
+
vi   vj
2
, i 6= j = 1; 2,
when all consumers belong to one network or the other. The market is fully covered (S1+ S2 =
1), if the two networks o¤er similar tari¤s (vi   vj is small), or the networks are su¢ ciently
di¤erentiated ( is large). I employ the standard assumption that  is su¢ ciently high to render
the market fully covered.
The prot of network i under uniform call prices equals
i = Si[(pi   Sic  (1  Si)(co + a))Di + ti   f ] + Si(1  Si) (a  ct)Dj ,
where ct (co) is the marginal cost of call termination (origination), c = ct + co, and f  0 is the
per-subscriber cost. The network derives its prots from three sources. The rst term inside the
brackets is the prot on outgoing calls, which is positive if the call price exceeds the perceived
marginal call cost Sic + (1   Si)(co + a) - a weighted average of calls inside and outside the
network. Second, the network earns a prot on subscriptions. The nal term constitutes the
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termination prot, which is positive if the markup on termination is positive.
Analysis Increasing the call price pi leads to higher prots for a given customer base and a
given number of outgoing calls. This is the rst term in marginal prot below. However, the
price increase comes at the cost of fewer subscribers and less outgoing calls:
@i
@pi
= SiDi +
@Si
@pi
[(pi   Sic  (1  Si)(co + a))Di + ti   f ]
+ Si (pi   Sic  (1  Si)(co + a)) @Di
@pi
+
@Si
@pi
Si(a  ct)Di + @Si
@pi
(Sj   Si) (a  ct)Dj
(2)
The rst term on the last line term constitutes a cost composition e¤ect. As the number of
subscribers goes down, more calls are terminated outside than in inside the network. The cost
composition e¤ect is negative whenever o¤-net calls are more costly than on-net calls (a  ct).
The nal term is the marginal e¤ect on termination prot. Fewer subscribers tends to reduce
subscription prot, but is mitigated by the fact that the number of incoming calls goes up. The
second e¤ect dominates the rst if the network is large and termination markup positive. Thus,
termination prot tends to balance market shares. Increasing the subscription fee ti has similar
e¤ects:
@i
@ti
= Si +
@Si
@ti
[(pi   Sic  (1  Si)(co + a))Di + ti   f ]
+ Si (pi   Sic  (1  Si)(co + a)) @Di
@ti
+
@Si
@ti
Si(a  ct)Di + @Si
@ti
(Sj   Si) (a  ct)Dj .
(3)
The network optimally sets call prices equal to the perceived marginal call cost, c + (1  
Si) (a  ct), so as to maximize the social surplus inside the network and then uses the sub-
scription fee to balance the loss of subscribers against surplus extraction. Lemma 1 generalizes
the existence and uniqueness results (Proposition 7) in La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) to the
case of income e¤ects:
Lemma 1 Assume that each network charges a uniform price for calls. When the utility of
subscribing to a network (v0) is not too small, the degree of substitutability (1=2) between the
two networks is not too high, and the income e¤ect (") is not too strong, there exists a unique
and symmetric equilibrium. The call price equals perceived marginal call cost, c+(a  ct)=2, and
the subscription fee T satises:
T   f
T
=
1
 @Si@ti 2T
  1
2
(a  ct)
T
D(c+ (a  ct) =2; T ). (4)
Proof: See the Appendix.
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The subscription fee T satises a modied Ramsey rule. The equilibrium elasticity of subscrip-
tion demand with respect to the subscription fee
 @Si
@ti
2T =
(c+ (a  ct) =2; T )T

is a measure of the intensity of competition for subscribers. The lower is the elasticity of
subscription demand, the higher is the equilibrium subscription fee, all else equal. Obviously,
subscription elasticity is lower the stronger is the degree of network di¤erentiation (the higher
is ), because then prices matter less for the choice of network. Second, subscription elasticity
is lower the lower is the marginal utility of income (i) because the subscription fee then is
less important for consumer net surplus. The Ramsey rule is corrected by the cost composition
e¤ect. Setting a low subscription fee and gaining a high market share is more protable if o¤-net
calls are more expensive on-net calls because the network then can save on call costs.
The networks choose the reciprocal termination rate a to maximize industry prot, which
under symmetry is equivalent to maximizing network prot
(a) = 12(T (a)  f) + 14 (a  ct)D(c+ (a  ct) =2; T (a)),
which consists entirely of subscription prot and termination prot since outgoing calls are priced
at perceived marginal call cost. By agreeing on a higher termination rate, the two networks a¤ect
termination prot as well as subscription prot:
0(a) = 12T
0(a) + 14 [Dj + (a  ct) (12
@Dj
@pj
+
@Dj
@tj
T 0(a))].
Each network runs a termination decit whenever the termination rate lies below the mar-
ginal termination cost (a  ct). If the subscription fee is increasing in the termination rate
(T 0(a)  0), raising the termination rate unequivocally lowers the termination decit (because
@Dj=@pj < 0 and @Dj=@tj  0; see the Appendix) and simultaneously increases the subscrip-
tion prot. Thus, setting a termination rate below marginal termination cost is protable only
if the subscription fee decreases su¢ ciently fast in the termination rate. Di¤erentiation of the
equilibrium subscription fee (4) yields
T 0(a) =
 12 @@pi

 @Si@ti 2T

  12(Dj + 12 (a  ct)
@Dj
@pj
)(@Si@ti 2T )
2
(@Si@ti 2T )
2

1 + 12 (a  ct)
@Dj
@tj
+ 14
@i
@ti
(@Si@ti )
2
 .
Increasing the termination rate a¤ects the subscription fee through two channels.6 An anti-
competitive e¤ect pulls in the direction of a higher subscription fee. Increasing the termination
rate softens competition for subscribers because the marginal utility of income goes down and
6Note that the denominator is strictly positive for all a  ct because @Dj=@tj  0 and @i=@ti  0 with
equality if and only if " = 0, see the Appendix.
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thereby the subscription elasticity:
@
@pi

 @Si
@ti
2T

@pi
@a
=
1
2
@i
@pi
T

=
1
2
"(   1)U 00 (Di)Di
"p2i   U 00 (Di)
T

 0.
Second, a higher termination rate reinforces the cost composition e¤ect and tends to lower the
equilibrium subscription fee. The anti-competitive e¤ect does not appear in the workhorse model
because subscription elasticity there is independent of the termination rate (formally: i = 1
for " = 0). The cost composition e¤ect exactly o¤sets the e¤ect on termination prot, which
renders prot independent of the termination rate. In the more general case of non-zero income
e¤ects, the anti-competitive e¤ect is just big enough to pull in favour of high termination rates:
Proposition 1 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 1 hold, so that there exists a unique and
symmetric equilibrium. Then, network prot is independent of the termination rate if and only if
the income e¤ect is zero (" = 0). In the presence of income e¤ects (" > 0), any prot maximizing
access price (if it exists) lies strictly above the marginal cost of termination.
Proof: See the Appendix.
To gain additional insight into the mechanism driving prot neutrality, return to the A-LRT
model, i.e. assume that there are no income e¤ects. Let v(a) = V (c + (a   ct)=2; T (a)) be
consumer net surplus in symmetric equilibrium given the termination rate a. Dene (v(a)) 
(@=@vijv1=v2=v(a))2v(a), the equilibrium subscription elasticity with respect to consumer net
surplus. With quasi-linear preferences, the shadow price of the budget constraint equals unity
( = 1), and the equilibrium subscription fee solves:
T = f +
v(a)
(v(a))
  1
2
(a  ct)D(c+ (a  ct) =2).
Substituting the subscription fee above into consumer net surplus v(a) and the prot function
(a) yields after simplications
v(a) =
(v(a))
1 + (v(a))
W (a), 2(a) =
1
1 + (v(a))
W (a), (5)
where
W (a) = U(D (c+ (a  ct) =2)) + I   cD (c+ (a  ct) =2)  f
is social surplus net of the utility of holding a subscription (v0) and of the cost of horizon-
tal di¤erentiation (minfk ; (1   k)g). Social surplus is divided between the consumers and
the industry in proportion to the subscription elasticity (v(a)). Most of the surplus goes to
the consumers whenever subscription demand is elastic because of an intense competition for
subscribers. Conversely, the networks extract most of the surplus under inelastic subscription
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demand because competition is weak in this case. The networks a¤ect by their choice of access
price both the size W (a) of the social surplus to be divided and the share of that surplus the
networks receive through the e¤ect on competition (v(a)).7 Under prot neutrality, the in-
tensity of competition changes in exact proportion with social surplus. To see the fundamental
property behind this result, divide 2(a) by v(a) in (5) and rewrite: (a) = v(a)=2(v(a)). Ob-
viously, prot neutrality holds if and only if equilibrium subscription elasticity is proportional
to consumer net surplus, i.e. (v(a)) = kv(a) for some k > 0. The Hotelling model features
proportional subscription demand at symmetric prices: (v) = v= for all v, and therefore prot
neutrality follows.8
Prot neutrality is a knife-edge result because it hinges on equilibrium subscription elastic-
ity being exactly proportional to consumer net surplus. Introducing even very small income
e¤ects breaks the proportionality and therefore prot neutrality. With income e¤ects, social
surplus grows faster than the intensity of competition for low termination rates, and so the
prot maximizing termination rate is above the marginal cost of termination.
3 Call Price Discrimination: The O¤-Net Price Puzzle
The Model I now generalize the model in the previous section by allowing the networks to
price discriminate between calls within the network (on-net) and calls outside the network (o¤-
net). Price discrimination creates network externalities in the sense that the optimal choice of
network now depends also on the size of the network and not only on prices. Every subscriber
to network i = 1; 2 places qoni calls at the price p
on
i per call to every subscriber in the same
network (on-net), and qoffi calls at the price p
off
i per call to every subscriber in network j 6= i to
maximize utility SiU (qoni )+SjU(q
off
i )+Z(yi) and subject to the budget constraint Sip
on
i q
on
i +
Sjp
off
i q
off
i + yi + ti  I.
Utility maximization yields on-net demand Doni = D
on(pi; ti; Si), o¤-net demand D
off
i =
Doff (pi; ti; Si), demand Yi = Y (pi; ti; Si) for the numeraire good and a shadow price of the
subscription fee i = (pi; ti; Si) when all consumers have a subscription, S1 + S2 = 1, and
pi = (p
on
i ; p
off
i ) is the call-price prole of network i. Because of the income e¤ect, on-net and
o¤-net calls are substitutes, call demand decreases in the subscription fee and is ambiguous with
respect to changes in the customer base; see the Appendix. Dene
uoni = u
on(pi; ti; Si) = U (D
on(pi; ti; Si))  (pi; ti; Si)poni Don(pi; ti; Si)
7The socially optimal choice of access charge is ct when no income e¤ects are present. Di¤erentiate: W 0(a) =
U 0(Di) 12
@Di
@pi
  c 1
2
@Di
@pi
= 1
4
(a   ct) @Di@pi , where I have used U
0(Di) = pi = c + (a   ct)=2. Social surplus W (a) is
single-peaked in a and reaches its global maximum at ct because @Di=@pi < 0 and W 0(ct) = 0.
8More generally, all models in which market share is determined by the di¤erence in consumer net surplus,
Si = g(vi   vj), feature proportional subscription demand: (v) = 2g0(0)v. The random utility model rst used
by Dessein (2003) for the duopoly case and extended by Calzada and Valletti (2008) to the general n network case
belongs to this class of models: Si = (1 +
P
j 6=i e
  1

fvi vjg) 1, and (v) = 1

n 1
n
v. However, prot neutrality
does not imply that subscription demand is a function of the di¤erences in consumer net surplus. For example,
Si = g((vi=vj)
vj   1) does not have this property, but still is proportional: (v) = 2g0(0)v.
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the indirect utility of reaching an on-net subscriber in network i, and let uoffi = u
off (pi; ti; Si) be
the similarly dened indirect utility of reaching an o¤-net subscriber from network i. Consumer
net surplus in network i is
vi = V (pi; ti; Si) = Siu
on(pi; ti; Si) + (1  Si)uoff (pi; ti; Si) + Z(Y (pi; ti; Si))
+(pi; ti; Si)(I   ti   Y (pi; ti; Si)),
when all consumers belong to one network or the other. Under the standard assumption of
di¤erentiated networks,
Si = (V (pi; ti; Si); V (pj ; tj ; 1  Si)) (6)
uniquely denes subscription demand Si in rational expectations equilibrium as a function of
call prices (pi;pj) and subscription fees (ti; tj). The prot of network i equals
i = Si[Si (p
on
i   c)Doni + Sj(poffi   a  co)Doffi + ti   f ] + SiSj (a  ct)Doffj .
Owing to price discrimination, call prot can now be split into the prot of outgoing on-net
calls and the prot on outgoing o¤-net calls. Termination prot and subscription prot adds to
network prot, as under uniform pricing.
Analysis By increasing the on-net price, the network earns a higher revenue per on-net call,
but at the cost of a smaller number of subscribers and less on-net calls per subscriber. These
three e¤ects constitute the three rst terms below:
@i
@poni
= S2iD
on
i +
@Si
@poni
[Si (p
on
i   c)Doni + Sj(poffi   a  co)Doffi + ti   f ]
+ S2i (p
on
i   c)
@Doni
@poni
+
@Si
@poni
[(poni   c)Doni   (poffi   a  co)Doffi ]
+
@Si
@poni
(Sj   Si) (a  ct)Doffj + Si

Si (p
on
i   c)
@Doni
@Si
@Si
@poni
+ Sj(p
off
i   a  co)
 
@Doffi
@poni
+
@Doffi
@Si
@Si
@poni
!
  Sj (a  ct)
@Doffj
@Sj
@Si
@poni
#
.
(7)
The second term on the second line is a composition e¤ect, same as under uniform pricing:
Fewer subscribers means that relatively more calls are terminated o¤-net. The composition
e¤ect could be positive or negative depending on the protability of on-net calls relative to o¤-
net calls. The rst term on the third line is marginal termination prot. Increasing the on-net
price generally a¤ects demand for all types of calls through the budget constraint. The remaining
terms characterize these income e¤ects. Raising the o¤-net price poffi and the subscription fee
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ti have similar e¤ects. For example:
@i
@ti
= Si +
@Si
@ti
[Si (p
on
i   c)Doni + Sj(poffi   a  co)Doffi + ti   f ]
+
@Si
@ti
[(poni   c)Doni   (poffi   a  co)Doffi ]
+
@Si
@ti
(Sj   Si) (a  ct)Doffj + Si

Si (p
on
i   c)

@Doni
@ti
+
@Doni
@Si
@Si
@ti

+ Sj(p
off
i   a  co)
 
@Doffi
@ti
+
@Doffi
@Si
@Si
@ti
!
  Sj (a  ct)
@Doffj
@Sj
@Si
@ti
#
.
(8)
Lemma 2 generalizes the existence and uniqueness results (Proposition 5) in La¤ont, Rey
and Tirole (1998b) to the case of income e¤ects:
Lemma 2 Assume that both networks price discriminate between on-net and o¤-net calls. When
the utility of subscribing to a network (v0) is not too small, the degree of substitutability (1=2)
between the two networks is not too high, and the income e¤ect (") is not too strong, there
exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium. Call prices equal marginal call cost: P on = c and
P off = a+ co. The subscription fee satises:
T   f
T
=
1
 @Si@ti 2T
+
1
4
(a  ct)
T
@Doffj (c; a+ co; T; 1=2)
@Sj
. (9)
Proof: See the Appendix.
The network optimally sets call prices at marginal call cost to maximize the social surplus inside
the network and then uses the subscription fee to balance the loss of subscribers against surplus
extraction. The optimal subscription fee satises a modied Ramsey rule. The composition
e¤ect vanishes compared to the subscription fee (4) under uniform pricing: The network does
not care about a larger fraction of outgoing calls being terminated o¤-net when the markup
on all outgoing calls is zero. Instead, an expression related to termination prot shows up. A
higher market share of the other network a¤ects demand for o¤-net (as well as on-net) calls in
that network through the income e¤ect.
Just as was the case under uniform pricing, the subscription fee and termination prot are
the sole sources of network prot
(a) = 12(T (a)  f) + 14 (a  ct)Doff (c; a+ co; T (a); 1=2)
because outgoing calls are priced at marginal cost. The marginal e¤ect on industry prot of
increasing the reciprocal termination rate a thus equals:
0(a) = 12T
0(a) + 14 [D
off
j + (a  ct) (
@Doffj
@poffj
+
@Doffj
@tj
T 0(a))]. (10)
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Whether setting an termination rate below marginal termination cost is protable depends on
the sensitivity of the subscription fee to changes in the termination rate. If the subscription fee
is non-decreasing in the termination rate (T 0(a)  0), it is protable to increase the termination
rate from any point below marginal termination cost (a  ct) because then termination decit
falls and subscription prot increases. Only if the subscription fee falls su¢ ciently in the termi-
nation rate can it be protable to set a termination rate below the marginal cost of termination.
The key to understanding termination rate collusion under call price discrimination therefore
lies in exploring the sensitivity of the subscription fee to changes in the termination rate.
The equilibrium elasticity of subscription demand with respect to the subscription fee equals
 @Si
@ti
2T =
iT
   (uoni   uoffi )
(11)
under call price discrimination. As under uniform pricing, subscription elasticity is lower the
stronger is the degree of network di¤erentiation (the higher is ) and the lower is marginal utility
of income (i). Under call price discrimination, an additional network multiplier e¤ect intensies
competition. A lower subscription fee means a higher market share, all else equal. A larger
market share implies in turn that a larger fraction of every subscriberscalls are terminated on-
net. If it is more valuable to connect with someone in the same network compared to someone
in the other network (uoni > u
off
i ) a higher market share further accentuates the benet of
belonging to that network. In the presence of network e¤ects, there is a lot to gain in terms
of extra subscribers by lowering the subscription fee because the ow of consumers multiplies
itself. This process is faster the larger is the net benet of on-net calls compared to o¤-net calls
(measured by uoni   uoffi ).
Importantly, the networks a¤ect competition for subscribers through the choice of termina-
tion rate because a higher o¤-net price lowers the marginal value of income (@i=@p
off
i  0) and
strengthens the network e¤ect (@(uoni  uoffi )=@poffi > 0). The net e¤ect is ambiguous in general
and depends on the magnitude of the income e¤ect and the degree of network di¤erentiation:
@
@poffi

 @Si
@ti
2T

=
Ti
poffi (   (uoni   uoffi ))
0BBBB@@(u
on
i   uoffi )
@poffi
poffi
   (uoni   uoffi )| {z }
+
+
@i
@poffi
poffi
i| {z }
 =0
1CCCCA .
The elasticity of the network e¤ect is weak in the standard case of di¤erentiated networks (
is high). Nonetheless, the networks soften competition by setting a termination rate below
the marginal cost of termination in the workhorse (A-LRT) model (see e.g. Gans and King,
2001) because marginal utility of income then is constant (i = 1). Even small income e¤ects
are enough to overturn this result, and render it protable for the networks to agree on a
termination rate above the marginal cost of termination:
Proposition 2 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 2 hold, so that there exists a unique and
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symmetric equilibrium under call price discrimination. The prot maximizing access price lies
below the marginal cost of termination if the income e¤ect is zero. Then, the o¤-net price is lower
than the on-net price. In the presence of income e¤ects and if the networks are di¤erentiated, the
prot maximizing access price instead lies above the marginal cost of termination. In this second
case, the o¤-net price is higher than the on-net price (If " = 0, then P on   P off = ct   a > 0.
If " > 0, but small, and " > 2=(   1), then P off   P on = a  ct > 0).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above results on access price collusion under uniform prices (Proposition 1) and under call
price di¤erentiation (Proposition 2) are derived under standard assumptions. The underlying
assumption of di¤erentiated networks is quite common in the literature because network di¤er-
entiation allows a high degree of freedom in the choice of termination rates, while preserving
concavity of the prot function and uniqueness of subscription demand. Propositions 1 and 2
demonstrate that it then only takes a minor departure from the workhorse, A-LRT, model to
reverse the puzzling results and instead deliver results in line with regulatory concern and the
pricing policies the networks actually use.
4 Conclusion
I generalize the workhorse model of network competition (Armstrong, 1998; La¤ont, Rey and
Tirole, 1998,a,b) to allow for income e¤ects in call demand. In the standard case of di¤erentiated
networks, weak income e¤ects are enough to deliver results in line with stylized facts: The
networks have an incentive to agree on high mobile termination rates to soften competition, and
not the other way around. The networks set o¤-net prices that are higher than on-net prices,
and not the other way around. This vindicates the use of (a perturbation of) the workhorse
model of network competition.
With income e¤ects, call demand is sensitive to changes in disposable income, for example
through a reduction in the subscription fee. The existence of income e¤ects in call demand, and
therefore the relevance of the model, is testable. I leave empirical examination of the model and
the assumptions underlying it for future research.
Appendix
Call demand
Uniform call prices Construct the Lagrangian Li = U (qi)+Z(yi)+i(I ti piqi yi), where
i is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Total di¤erentiation of
the optimality conditions U 0 (Di)   ipi = 0, Z 0(Yi)   i = 0, i(I   ti   piDi   Yi) = 0 and
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i  0 yield: 26664
U 00 (Di) 0  pi
0 Z 00(Yi)  1
 ipi  i 0
37775
26664
dDi
dYi
di
37775 =
26664
idpi
0
i (Didpi + dti)
37775
under the assumption of a fully covered market, S1 + S2 = 1. Apply Cramers rule to the
optimality conditions:
@Di
@pi
= i Z
00(Yi)piDi
U 00(Di)+Z00(Yi)p2i
< 0,
@Di
@ti
=  Z
00(Yi)pi
U 00(Di)+Z00(Yi)p2i
 0,
@i
@pi
= Z
00(Yi)U 00(Di)( 1)Di
U 00(Di)+Z00(Yi)p2i
 0, @i
@ti
=  Z
00(Yi)U 00(Di)
U 00(Di)+Z00(Yi)p2i
 0.
Call Price Discrimination Construct the Lagrangian
Li = SiU (qoni ) + SjU(qoffi ) + Z(yi) + i(I   ti   Siponi qoni   Sjpoffi qoffi   yi),
where i  0 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
The three rst-order conditions U 0 (Doni ) iponi = 0, U 0(Doffi ) ipoffi = 0, Z 0(Yi) i = 0,
along with the the complementary slackness condition i(I ti Siponi Doni  Sjpoffi Doffi  Yi) = 0
dene four non-linear equations in the four unknowns (Doni ; D
off
i ; Yi;i). By total di¤erentiation
of the optimality conditions:
26666664
U 00 (Doni ) 0 0  poni
0 U 00(Doffi ) 0  poffi
0 0 Z 00(Yi)  1
 iSiponi  iSjpoffi  i 0
37777775
26666664
dDoni
dDoffi
dYi
di
37777775 =
26666666664
idp
on
i
idp
off
i
0
i(SiD
on
i dp
on
i + SjD
off
i dp
off
i
+dti + (p
on
i D
on
i   poffi Doffi )dSi)
37777777775
,
under the assumption of a fully covered market, S1 + S2 = 1. The determinant of the bordered
Hessian is  iU 00 (Doni )U 00(Doffi )Hi, where
Hi = 1 +
Z 00(Yi)Si(poni )
2
U 00 (Doni )
+
Z 00(Yi)(1  Si)(poffi )2
U 00(Doffi )
 1.
Dene the total call elasticity
oni =  
dDoni
d(iponi )
ip
on
i
Doni
=   U
0 (Doni )
U 00 (Doni )D
on
i
,
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and let offi be similarly dened. In La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b), U (q) = (1  1) 1q1 
 1
,
which implies a constant elasticity oni = 
off
i =  > 1.
By repeated application of Cramers rule, the following comparative statics results are
straightforward:
@Doni
@poni
U 00 (Doni )Hi = i   Z 00(Yi)(Siponi Doni + offi Sjpoffi Doffi ),
@Doni
@poni
U 00 (Doni )Hi = i   Z 00(Yi)(Siponi Doni + offi Sjpoffi Doffi ),
@Doffi
@poni
U 00(Doffi )
poffi
Hi =
@i
@poni
Hi = Z
00(Yi) (oni   1)SiDoni ,
@Doni
@poffi
U 00(Doni )Hi
poni
= @i
@poffi
Hi = Z
00(Yi)(
off
i   1)SjDoffi ,
@Doffi
@poffi
U 00(Doffi )Hi = i   Z 00(Yi)(oni Siponi Doni + Sjpoffi Doffi ),
@Doni
@ti
U 00(Doni )Hi
poni
=
@Doffi
@ti
U 00(Doffi )Hi
poffi
= @i@ti Hi =  Z 00(Yi),
@Doni
@Si
U 00(Doni )Hi
poni
=
@Doffi
@Si
U 00(Doffi )Hi
poffi
= @i@SiHi = Z
00(Yi)(p
off
i D
off
i   poni Doni ).
Proof of Lemma 1
Subtract (@i=@ti)Di from @i=@pi, using @vi=@pi = (@vi=@ti)Di =  iDi, to get
@i
@pi
  @i
@ti
Di = Si (pi   Sic  (1  Si)(co + a))

@Di
@pi
 Di@Di
@ti

.
Assuming that Si > 0, the right-hand side of this expression is positive for all pi < Sic + (1  
Si)(co + a) and negative for all pi > Sic+ (1  Si)(co + a) because
@Di
@pi
  @Di
@ti
Di =
i
U 00 (Di) + Z 00i p
2
i
< 0.
Therefore, the rst-order conditions @i=@pi = 0 and @i=@ti = 0 are satised at Si > 0 only
if Pi = Sic + (1   Si)(co + a). At an interior optimum, therefore, outgoing calls are priced at
weighted marginal call cost. In symmetric equilibrium, Si = 1=2, so P1 = P2 = c+ (a  ct)=2.
Existence of a unique and symmetric equilibrium At Pi = c + (1   Si) (a  ct) and
" = 0, the prot function i is strictly quasi-concave in ti, the subscription fees are strategic
complements and the reaction functions have a slope which is positive, but below unity; see
La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a). By continuity, these properties extend also to the case with non-
zero but weak income e¤ects (" & 0). Hence, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium,
provided v0 is large,  is large and " is small. Given P (a) = c + (a   ct)=2, the symmetric
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subscription fee solves the rst-order condition
@i
@ti
= 0, T = f + 1 2@Si@ti
  (a  ct)D(c+ (a  ct) =2; T )=2,
which can be rewritten on the Ramsey form (4).
Proof of Proposition 1
If v0 is large,  is large and " is small, but positive, the equilibrium subscription fee is given by
(4). In the Hotelling model  2@Si=@ti = (pi; ti)= , hence the symmetric subscription fee in
this case solves:
T = f + =(c+ (a  ct) =2; T )  (a  ct)D(c+ (a  ct) =2; T )=2.
By implicit di¤erentiation:
T 0(a) =  


2
@i
@pi
+Di +
1
2 (a  ct) @Di@pi

2 + 2
2i
@i
@ti
+ (a  ct) @Di@ti
,
which is of ambiguous sign. Plugging the expression for T (a) into the equilibrium prot function,
industry prot simplies to 2(a) = =(c + (a  ct) =2; T (a)). By substituting in the above
expression for T 0(a):
20(a) =   
2i

1
2
@i
@pi
+
@i
@ti
T 0(a)

=

2i
@i
@ti
Di   @i@pi + 12 (a  ct)

@Di
@pi
@i
@ti
  @Di@ti
@i
@pi

2 + 2
2i
@i
@ti
+ (a  ct) @Di@ti
.
Recall, @i=@ti  0 and @Di=@ti  0, so the denominator is strictly positive for all a  ct. All
terms in the numerator are zero whenever " = 0 because then @i=@ti = @i=@pi = @Di=@ti = 0.
For " > 0, the rst two terms in the numerator are strictly positive because then @i=@ti > 0
and @i=@pi < 0. The second term in the numerator is non-negative for all a  ct because
@i=@ti  0, @Di=@pi < 0, @i=@pi  0 and @Di=@ti  0. Thus, 0(a) > 0 for all a  ct and
" > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Marginal cost pricing of outgoing calls By total di¤erentiation of (6):
dSi =  
@
@vi
i(SiD
on
i dp
on
i + SjD
off
i dp
off
i + dti)
1  @@vi (uoni   u
off
i ) +
@
@vj
(uonj   uoffj )
. (12)
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Take advantage of the fact that @Si=@poni = (@Si=@ti)SiD
on
i and @Si=@p
off
i = (@Si=@p
off
i )SjD
off
i ,
subtract (8) from (7) and @i=@ti from @i=@p
off
i to get:
@i
@poni
  SiDoni
@i
@ti
= S2i (p
on
i   c)

@Doni
@poni
  SiDoni @D
on
i
@ti

+ SiSj(p
off
i   a  co)

@Doffi
@poni
  SiDoni @D
off
i
@ti
 (13)
@i
@poffi
  SjDoffi
@i
@ti
= S2i (p
on
i   c)

@Doni
@poffi
  SjDoffi @D
on
i
@ti

+ SiSj(p
off
i   a  co)

@Doffi
@poffi
  SjDoffi @D
off
i
@ti
 (14)
Under the assumption of Si > 0, the right-hand side of (13) is strictly negative if poni > c and
poffi  a+ co and strictly positive if poni < c and poffi  a+ co because
@Doni
@poni
  SiDoni @D
on
i
@ti
=
i Z00(Yi)offi Sjpoffi Doffi
U 00(Doni )Hi
< 0
@Doffi
@poni
  SiDoni @D
off
i
@ti
=
Z00(Yi)oni Sip
off
i D
on
i
U 00(Doffi )Hi
 0.
At optimum @i=@poni = @i=@ti = 0, so P
on
i 6= c is part of a prot maximizing two-part tari¤
only if sgnfP oni   cg = sgnfP offi   a  cog.
Add (13) and (14):
@i
@poni
+
@i
@poffi
 (SiDoni +SjDoffi )
@i
@ti
= S2i (P
on
i   c)
 
@Doni
@poni
+
@Doni
@poffi
  (SiDoni + SjDoffi )
@Doni
@ti
!
+ SiSj(P
off
i   a  co)
 
@Doffi
@poni
+
@Doffi
@poffi
  (SiDoni + SjDoffi )
@Doffi
@ti
!
= 0
at optimum. After some algebraic manipulations:
@Doni
@poni
+
@Doni
@poffi
  (SiDoni + SjDoffi )
@Doni
@ti
=
i(1 + "SjP
off
i (P
on
i   P offi )=U 00(Doffi ))
U 00 (Doni )Hi
. (15)
As shown by La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b), prot maximization implies P oni = c, P
off
i =
a + co for " = 0. By continuity, lim"!0 "SjP
off
i (P
on
i   P offi )=U 00(Doffi ) = lim"!0 "Sj(a +
co)(ct   a)=U 00
 
U 0 1(a+ co)

= 0. Thus, for " small, but positive, prot maximization im-
plies (15) negative. By an analogous argument, even @Doffi =@p
on
i + @D
off
i =@p
off
i   (SiDoni +
SjD
off
i )(@D
off
i =@ti) is negative for " small. Thus, any equilibrium satisfying P
on
i 6= c implies
sgnfP oni   cg =  sgnfP offi   a  cog for " small but positive, which contradicts the necessary
condition sgnfP offi   a   cog = sgnfP oni   cg, previously established. Thus, for " small, but
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positive: P oni = c and by implication also P
off
i = a+ co.
Existence of a unique and symmetric equilibrium At P oni = c, P
off
i = a+co and " = 0, the
prot function i is strictly quasi-concave in ti, the subscription fees are strategic complements
and the reaction functions have a slope which is positive, but below unity; see La¤ont, Rey and
Tirole (1998b). By continuity, these properties extend also to the case with non-zero, but weak
income e¤ects. Hence, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium, provided v0 is large,
 is large and " is small. Outgoing calls are priced at e¤ective marginal cost, P oni = c and
P offi = a+ co. The subscription fee solves the rst-order condition
@i
@ti
= 0, T = f + 1 2@Si@ti
+
(a  ct)
4
@Donj
@Sj
,
which can be rewritten on the Ramsey form (9).
Proof of Proposition 2
First, some preliminaries. In the Hotelling model @Si=@ti =  i=(2 +uoffi  uoni +uoffj  uonj );
see (12). Hence, the symmetric subscription fee solves:
T = f +
 + uoff (c; a+ co; T; 1=2)  uon(c; a+ co; T; 1=2)
(c; a+ co; T; 1=2)
+
1
4
(a  ct)
@Doffj (c; a+ co; T; 1=2)
@Sj
.
By total di¤erentiation of the subscription fee:
T 0(a) =
 

 + U(Doffi )  U (Doni )

@i
@poffi
  2iDoffi + 
2
i
4

@Doffj
@Sj
+ (a  ct) @
2Doffj
@Sj@p
off
j


 + U(Doffi )  U (Doni )

@i
@ti
+ 2i

1  14 (a  ct)
@2Doffj
@Sj@tj
 .
Zero income e¤ects (" = 0) Now i = 1, @i=@p
off
i = @i=@ti = 0, @D
off
j =@Sj = 0 and
@2Doffj =@Sj@p
off
j = @
2Doffj =@Sj@tj = 0, so T
0(a) =  Doffi , which implies
20(a) = 12 [D
off
j + (a  ct)
@Doffj
@poffj
] + T 0(a) = 12 [(a  ct)
@Doffj
@poffj
 Doffj ] < 0 for all a  ct,
where I have used symmetry, Doffi = D
off
j , and @D
off
j =@p
off
j < 0.
Non-zero income e¤ects (" > 0) Since @Doffj =@p
off
j < 0 and @D
off
j =@tj  0, it is su¢ cient
that T 0(a)  0 for all a  ct to render 20(a) > 0 for all a  ct, see (10). I need to show that
T 0(a) > 0 for " su¢ ciently low and  su¢ ciently large. Let  = " 1, where  (   1) > 2.
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Recall, @i=@p
off
i =  "(   1)SjDoffi =Hi and @i=@ti = "=Hi. Plug into T 0(a) above to get
T 0(a) =

 + "U(Doffi )  "U (Doni )

(   1)Doffi   2Hi2i

Doffi   14
@Doffj
@Sj
  14 (a  ct)
@2Doffj
@Sj@p
off
j

2

 + "U(Doffi )  "U (Doni )

+ 2Hi2i

1  14 (a  ct)
@2Doffj
@Sj@tj
 .
By inspection of the comparative statics in this appendix, @Doffj =@Sj ! 0, @2Doffj =@Sj@poffj !
0 and @2Doffj =@Sj@tj ! 0, as " ! 0. Moreover, Hi ! 1, i ! 1 and Doffi ! U 0 1(a + co) as
"! 0. Thus, lim"!0 T 0(a) = ( (   1)  2)U 0 1(a+ co)=2( + 1) > 0 in this case.
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